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Abstract 
During the recent period of economic crisis, many countries have introduced scrappage 
schemes to boost the sale and production of vehicles, particularly of vehicles designed to 
pollute less. In this paper, we analyze the impact of a particular scheme in Spain 
(Plan2000E) on vehicle prices and sales figures as well as on the reduction of polluting 
emissions from vehicles on the road. We considered the introduction of this scheme an 
exogenous policy change and because we could distinguish a control group (non-subsidized 
vehicles) and a treatment group (subsidized vehicles), before and after the introduction of 
the Plan, we were able to carry out our analysis as a quasi-natural experiment. Our study 
reveals that manufacturers increased vehicle prices by the same amount they were granted 
through the Plan (1,000 €). In terms of sales, econometric estimations revealed an increase 
of almost 5% as a result of the implementation of the Plan. With regard to environmental 
efficiency, we compared the costs (inverted quantity of money) and the benefits of the 
program (reductions in polluting emissions and additional fiscal revenues) and found that 
the Plan would only be beneficial if it boosted demand by at least 30%. 
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1. Introduction	
The automotive industry is widely considered one of the most important manufacturing 
sectors in a country’s economy. Its high level of production and its labor demand make it a 
visible sector in any economy. The current economic crisis experienced by Western 
economies starting in 2008 has significantly impacted this industry, particularly in terms of 
automobile sales. 
Reduced sales resulting in increased unemployment in the sector coupled with demands to 
meet targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions – a result of the UN 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and the Kyoto Protocol – has led many Western 
governments to introduce special programs aimed at increasing vehicle replacement 
through new purchases.  
These programs were essentially designed to fulfill two objectives: increase automobile 
sales (thereby minimizing redundancies), and reduce greenhouse gas emission levels 
generated by the number (and type) of vehicles on the road. These policies were 
implemented in countries such as Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States during 2008 and 2009. 
Although there were many countries that introduced these programs and approved their 
costs in governmental annual budgets, little attention has been paid to their effect on 
economies and, as far as we know, there are no studies into their effect in Europe. Nor are 
there any studies into the impact of governmental aid on prices set by industry. 
One governmental aid program in the United States that has been extensively analyzed 
called for the adoption of a hybrid vehicle.5 The program offered a rebate of up to $2,000 
and was introduced in 2001. A new version was introduced in 2005, increasing the rebate 
to $3,400. Diamond (2009) carried out a first estimate of the impact of this program on the 
sale of certain hybrid car models (Toyota Prius, Honda Civic and Ford Escape) and the 
results showed an increase of approximately 18%, depending on the model.  
Beresteanu and Li (2011) studied public aid and the effect of gasoline prices on the 
purchase of hybrid vehicles. The results of the study showed that if the price of gasoline 
had not increased between 1999 and 2006, there would be 37% fewer hybrid vehicles on 
the roads. In terms of public aid, the authors estimated that the program stimulated a 20% 
increase in the demand for hybrid vehicles. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) analyzed this 
same program in United States and found a similar result (a 22% increase in demand). 
Other studies include a report by Huang (2010) in which he analyzed the “Cash for 
Clunkers” program introduced in United States. This program was introduced in March 
2009 and offered between $3,500 and $4,500 to exchange an old vehicle for a more energy 
efficient one. If the savings were between 4 and 9 miles per gallon of gasoline, the owner 
                                                 
5 A hybrid vehicle combines an electric engine and an internal combustion engine. 
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received $3,500, and if the savings were even greater they received $4,5006. The study 
shows how the average amount awarded ($4,224) boosted demand for more energy 
efficient vehicles by between 25% and 30%.7 
Given that most studies focus on the promotion of hybrid vehicle sales in the U.S market 
(and not the impact on prices), the objective of this study was to analyze the impact of a 
program that promotes pollution reducing vehicles (Plan 2000E in Spain) from three 
different perspectives: firstly, on the prices set by automobile manufacturers (the effect of 
subsidy on price); secondly, its effect on the sales of automobiles, and thirdly, on the 
viability of the program in terms of environmental benefits (measured by assessing 
empirical evidence). 
Our study will contribute to the literature surrounding this issue in the following ways: 
firstly, as far as we know, the impact of public assistance on prices set by manufacturers has 
not been previously analyzed. Secondly, studies that analyze European cases are not 
available in the literature. Thirdly, we provide evidence on the environmental viability of 
the program, by comparing its costs and the environmental benefits. 
The difference-in-difference analyses revealed that the manufacturers’ response to the 
introduction of the Plan was to significantly increase the prices of the subsidized vehicles, 
thereby keeping a part of the funds. The fact that automobile manufacturers (hereinafter 
manufacturers) received one part of the credit by increasing vehicle prices illustrates that 
the effect of the Plan on the sales and on pollution reduction levels is actually quite low, 
which significantly reduces the efficiency of the Plan. Econometric results showed that the 
impact of the program on the sales of automobiles was only around 5%. 
Our results also indicate that the costs of the program far exceed the resultant 
environmental benefits, and as such Plan 2000E not only turned out to be inefficient, but 
probably was socially undesirable too. 
Section 2 describes the characteristics and the implementation of Plan 2000E in detail and 
Section 3 focuses on the data used in the empirical study, which is presented in Section 4 
for both objectives (effects and environmental efficiency). Conclusions are given in Section 
5. 
2. Plan 2000E 
The manufacture of automobiles and bicycles in Spain during 2009 was valued at 
approximately 40 billion euros and employed 145,645 workers that same year. These 
figures accounted for 11.5% of total production and 7.2% of employment in all 
                                                 
6 An extensive explanation of the “Cash for Clunkers” program is available in Cooper et al (2010) and 
Yacobucci and Canis (2010). 
7 Alberini et al (1995) present a theoretical model in order to determine user participation in vehicle 
substitution programs. Nevertheless, the participation ratios estimated from the model are quite distant from 
those confirmed in empirical studies, reaching 78% by offering only $2,000. 
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manufacturing sectors8. These figures demonstrate the importance of this sector in the 
Spanish economy, and explain why this industry has received so much media attention 
during the ongoing economic crisis. 
To put Spanish automobile manufacturing into an international perspective, Spain was the 
eighth largest manufacturer in the world and third largest in Europe in 2009. Despite this, 
there is evidence that starting in the end of 2007, the economic crisis was starting to affect 
the sector, and by 2009 the sector had reached an alarming level of suffering, with a 
reduction in year-on-year manufacturing of almost 20% for motor vehicles in businesses 
with more than two hundred employees, and 35% in the remaining businesses9. 
This negative evolution in the sector in 2008 and 2009 led the Spanish Government to take 
action (as did other countries with similar problems)10 by introducing a scrappage scheme 
that would reactivate sector activity, called Plan 2000E. This Plan would subsidize the 
replacement of an old vehicle for a new one, with specific characteristics, and was co-
financed by the National Government (who contributed 500€), the Autonomous 
Communities (who contributed 500€) and manufacturers (who contributed 1,000€) with 
the aim of providing a total subsidy of 2,000€. 
Only specific vehicles with the M1 classification could be subsidized (motor vehicles with 
at least four wheels, designed and manufactured for the transport of passengers) and those 
with the N1 classification (vehicles designed for the transport of merchandise, whose gross 
vehicle weight did not exceed 3.5 tons). A list of vehicle requirements is shown in Table 1. 
Consumers could benefit from the subsidy by exchanging an M1 or N1 classified vehicle, 
which was at least 10 years old or with a minimum of 250,000 km on the clock for a new 
vehicle that did not exceed 30,000€ (prior to applying the subsidy, with VAT taxes 
included) and met certain emissions criteria. The scheme could also be used for second 
hand purchases if the car being scrapped was at least 12 years old and the used was less 
than 5 years old.  
The subsidy consisted of a credit of 1,000€ added to the manufacturers price for each 
vehicle. Once the subsidy was applied (with other applicable discounts) and indirect taxes 
had been added, the subsidy from the National Government of €500 was applied, in 
addition to another 500€ from the autonomous community - if they were participating in 
the scheme 11. 
                                                 
8 MITYC. Estadística de Fabricación de Vehículos Automóviles y Bicicletas. 
9 Fundación SEPI (2009). Las empresas industriales en 2009: Encuesta sobre estrategias empresariales. 
10 During 2008 and 2009, public assistance was also provided to purchase of vehicles in Germany (2.500€ per 
vehicle, with a total of 600,000 vehicles being subsidized), Italy (rebate ranged from 1,500€ to 3,000€, 
depending on the vehicle), France (allocation of 1,000€, with approximately 400,000 vehicles subsidized), the 
United Kingdom (2,000 GBP, of which the Government contributes 1,000, and the manufacturers the rest) 
and the United States (rebate of $3,500 or $4,500, according to vehicle fuel consumption). 
11 As will be mentioned, not every Autonomous community did participate in the Plan. In fact, Madrid and 
La Rioja did not take advantage of the Plan from the beginning, and later on other communities also stopped 
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The first stage of Plan 2000E officially began on May 18th 2009 and would end on May 18th 
2010, or when the fixed objective was met, which was the financing of 200,000 vehicles12. 
However, the approved budget for Plan 2000E was used up in the first five months, 
according to data cited from the Ministry of Industry13 (this is an approximation; the timing 
is based on the official start date of the program to the end of August14). The speed with 
which the budget was used up caused the government to extend the number of subsidized 
vehicles by 80,000 in November 2009 (second stage), that is, an additional allocation of 40 
million euros15. Finally, with the market continuing to report falling annual car registrations 
and with the government considering that Plan 2000E had had a positive and dynamic 
effect16 on the economy, it approved the extension of the Plan once again in 2010. In this 
last stage (the third stage), the Plan was made effective from January 1st 2010 until 
September 30th 2010, or until the Plan had met its stated quantitative objectives i.e. 
subsidizing 200,000 vehicles. Plan 2000E officially ended in July 2010. In the first four 
months of 2010 75% of the allocated vehicles had been accounted for and it was expected 
that the full budget would be used up by May or June17. 
                                                                                                                                               
offering assistance. 
12 See footnote 9. 
13 “El Plan 2000E ha agotado ya el 75% de sus fondos”. Expansión (14/04/2010). 
14 “Cien millones en ayudas para el Plan 2000E”. http://motor.terra.es/ultimas-noticias-actualidad/articulo/cien-
plan-2000e-52271.htm 
15 BOE (Núm. 260, de 7 de noviembre de 2009. Págs.: 92952-02053). Real Decreto 1667/2009, de 6 de 
noviembre, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 898/2009, de 22 de mayo, por el que se regula la 
concesión directa de subvenciones para la adquisición de vehículos, Plan 2000 E de apoyo a la renovación del 
parque de vehículos, y se amplía el número máximo de vehículos a financiar en 80.000 vehículos adicionales. 
16 BOE (Núm. 7, de 8 de enero de 2010. Págs.: 2015-2020). Real Decreto 2031/2009, de 30 de diciembre, por 
el que se regula la concesión directa de subvenciones para la adquisición de vehículos, “Plan 2000E” de apoyo 
a la renovación del parque de vehículos durante el año 2010. 
17 “El Plan 2000E ha agotado ya el 75% de sus fondos”; Expansión (14/04/2010). “El Plan 2000E cumple su 
primer año de vigencia a punto de agotar sus fondos”; Cinco Días (17/05/2010). 
 6
Table 1. Requirements and planning 
Characteristics Price Emissions Others 
<120 gr./Km 
(ecological) M1 
<149 gr./Km 
(innovative) 
M1: Stability control; 
presence detection 
<149 gr./Km M1: Three way-catalyst; EGR valve 
Subsidizable vehicle < 30,000 € 
<160 gr./Km N1 
Planning 
Stage Legal period Real period Number of vehicles 
First May09-May10 May09-Aug09 200,000 
Second Nov09-Dec09 Nov09-Dec09 80,000 
Third Jan10-Sep10 Jan10-Jun10 200,000 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Almost all of the Autonomous Communities (hereinafter Communities) that participated in 
Plan 2000E (including Ceuta and Melilla) had signed up to the Plan by 2009, with Madrid 
and La Rioja being the two exceptions. Nevertheless, they both offered discounts on 
registration tax, with Madrid offering 20% and La Rioja between 15% and 38%. Some 
Communities such as Navarra, Galicia, Valencia and Cataluña offered their own plans, 
some of which increased the requirements set out by the Government. The rest of the 
Communities opted to contribute the standard 500€ set by the Government.  
In 2010 (during the third stage of the Plan) certain Communities such as Canarias, Asturias, 
and Islas Baleares were excluded because the funds had been used up. Other Communities 
such as País Vasco passed legislation in favor of the new Plan, but used up the funds 
quickly (by March 2010), while Galicia decided not to implement Plan 2000E (although it 
did subsidize efficient vehicles).  
In the first stage, there was a degree of uncertainty amongst the Communities as to how to 
react to the Plan; these doubts had increased by the third stage in 2010. Given that it was 
impossible to obtain detailed information on sales in each of the Communities, we 
measured the average impact of the Plan, i.e. variations in regional responses to the Plan. 
The characteristics of the Plan previously indicated allowed us to address this study as a 
quasi-natural experiment. As pointed out by Lafontaine and Slade (2008), a natural 
experiment must meet three criteria: 1) that there is an exogenous change in the market; 2) 
that there is a group affected by the change; 3) that there is a group that is not affected by 
the change, which fulfills the control group function. The introduction of the Plan meets 
these criteria perfectly: 1) the introduction of the Plan is a political decision, an agent that 
does not operate in the market and therefore the change is not produced as a consequence 
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of actions by the active manufacturers in the market; 2) the introduction of the Plan allows 
us to have a group of different versions of vehicles affected by the Plan (those that satisfy 
the criteria to join the Plan); 3) Plan 2000E creates a set of equal versions (even those 
found within the same vehicle model) that cannot be included in the Plan and hence 
represent an excellent control group. As the introduction of Plan 2000E meets the criteria 
of a natural experiment, which allows us to apply a difference-in-difference estimator, we 
can estimate the effect of the program on the prices set by the manufacturers in a relatively 
simple way. Since the two groups were formed after the introduction of the Plan they are 
not considered random – they were created by the Plan – we had to control our 
estimations by using characteristics that determine whether a vehicle belongs to one group 
or another i.e. the pollution level, which was estimated based on the horsepower of the 
vehicle. 
Although there are some positive reviews of the Plan, such as that from The Ministry of 
Industry, Tourism and Commerce who reported that the Plan generated good results and 
the Federation of Automobile Dealers Associations (Federación de Asociaciones de 
Concesionarios de Automoción) who were satisfied with the extension of Plan 2000E and the 
increase in sales reported in some months, there are still criticisms about the uncertainty of 
the Plan and the delays in the payments received18.  
The Spanish Competition Authority (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, CNC) has stated 
their concerns about the effects of the Plan on vehicle prices and that they have reason to 
believe that the automobile dealers had incentives to increase prices, not only to counteract 
the discount but to absorb part of the subsidy received by the consumers. According to the 
CNC (2009), it was expected that one result from Plan 2000E would be increased sales, 
reduced prices paid by the consumer and increases in the price received by the dealer, in a 
way that the difference between the price paid by the purchaser with the subsidy and the 
price that would be paid without the subsidy would be less than the subsidy itself.19 
3. Data 
To achieve our objective, we used a customized database with different sources, which 
included factory price, vehicle sale price to the public20, vehicle characteristics (security and 
comfort variables), monthly sales of each brand, as well as annual sales per vehicle model, 
and some control variables on income evolution (national Gross Domestic Product) and 
complementary goods prices (international crude price).21 
                                                 
18 Press release- FACONAUTO: “La incertidumbre en las CC.AA respecto al Plan 2000E ralentiza la venta de coches 
en enero” (15/01/2010); “La incertidumbre en los concesionarios sobre el Plan 2000E frena las ventas en abril” 
(16/04/2010); “Las Administraciones públicas adeudan a los concesionarios de automoción 13,9 millones” (23/06/2010). 
19 Spanish Competition Authority (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, 2009). II Informe anual sobre ayudas 
públicas. (2nd annual report on public assistance). 
20 The difference between the sale price to the public and the factory price are the registration taxes, indirect 
taxes and transport. 
21 Price data and characteristics were obtained from the website of Asociación Nacional de Vendedores de 
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The database contained monthly prices (when the price for specific versions of a vehicle is 
always modified) for the period between January 2007 and September 2010 and included 
vehicles from 35 brands sold in Spain. This equated to 732 specific versions,22 which had to 
be available on the market before and after the implementation of the Plan (which is one of 
the advantages of the average analysis carried out by the CNC, which is done by model). 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Manufacturer Price 20211.52 7200.35 6677.8 38574.93 
Gasoline 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Horsepower 135.31 47.65 55 320 
Guarantee (months) 29.58 10.53 24 84 
Trunk capacity 1187.99 550.74 267 3423 
ABS 0.97 0.16 0 1 
Number of airbags 5.15 2.04 0 9 
Power assisted steering 0.95 0.23 0 1 
Monthly sales per brand 3699.15 3119.79 0 16771 
Annual sales per model 3919.30 8954.96 1 77847 
GDP 266691.8 10073.61 251910 280679 
Crude 71.58 25.13 39.95 132.72 
Subsidizable 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The database includes those vehicles that have a public sale price of less than 50,000€ for 
two reasons: firstly, Plan 2000E establishes a requirement that the car price be less than 
30,000€; secondly, and most relevant, because the competition is diverse between vehicles 
with very high prices than those with low prices. It is expected that the vehicles that cost 
more than €50,000 would belong to a distinct product type market and would not directly 
compete with the identified automobiles in the Plan. 
Table 2 shows the average price of vehicles per brand, held in our database, which was 
20,211€. The prices ranged from approximately 6,000€ to 39,000€. 51% of the vehicles 
used a gasoline engine with 135 horsepower and an average guarantee of 29 months. The 
majority of the vehicles had anti-lock braking system (ABS) and power steering. During the 
                                                                                                                                               
Vehículos a Motor, Reparación y Recambios (GANVAM). Market data on monthly vehicle registrations were 
obtained from the Asociación Nacional de Importadores de Automóviles, Camiones, Autobuses y 
Motocicletas (ANIACAM). Nominal GDP came from INE and international crude prices from OPEC. 
22 A breakdown of the versions in our database follows; 289 are subsidizable vehicles, and 443 versions are 
non-subsidizable. 
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study period, the average monthly sales per brand represented 3,699 vehicles, and the price 
of crude ranged from $39.95 to $132.72 per barrel. 
Figure 1 shows monthly trends in vehicle sales; the point when Plan 2000E began is 
highlighted in red. From this date on and after each extension of the Plan, an increase in 
vehicle sales was observed. Nevertheless, vehicle sales clearly vary depending on the month 
being observation. After the introduction of Plan 2000E, the only months in which a 
different pattern was observed comparing the same months in different years were July 
2010 (a fall in car sales was observed and the date coincides with the end of the Plan), and 
November 2010 (an increase in sales was observed, even though Plan 2000E was no longer 
in place). With regard to the remaining periods when Plan 2000E was in place, the average 
monthly vehicle sales followed the same trends seen in previous years. 
 
Graph 1. Monthly Automobile Sales in Spain 
 
Source: ANIACAM. Own elaboration. 
 
Given the uncertainty during the application of Plan2000E, we wanted to identify whether 
there were any variations in behavior at the different stages of the Plan so we considered 
the different stages separately and assessed behavior. The first stage under consideration 
was the first four months after the Plan was officially launched (see footnotes 13 and 14), 
which ran from May to August 2009. This period saw the maximum availability of funds 
and maximum interest from the Communities. For the second stage, we considered the 
remaining period for the Plan, which ran from September 2009 to June 2010; this period 
definitively marked the end of the budget. These months are considered as a single group 
because of the uncertainty when, during September and October, it was discovered that 
funds were limited. In addition, there was continued uncertainty when the budget was 
increased at the end of 2009 and again in 2010. 
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In the other estimates we considered three periods: May to August 2009, September to 
October 2009 (when funds were limited and in some cases extremely scarce, even though 
these months continued to form part of the initial stage of the Plan), and November 2009 
to June 2010 (because in November 2009 and January 2010 new budgets were established, 
thus there were additional funds made available during these months to allow Plan 2000E 
to continue). 
In the proposed analysis by the CNC, it is stated that there is reason to believe that 
behavior varies depending on which price model is in place; subsidized or non-subsidized. 
Table 3 shows a similar analysis into the average prices for subsidized and non-subsidized 
vehicles before and after the introduction of the Plan. The analysis was carried out for the 
two periods highlighted above. 
 
Table 3. Average prices (nominal euros) by vehicle and period 
After (1) After (2) 
 Before 
May-
Aug09 
Sep09-
Jun10 
May-
Aug09 
Sep-
Oct09 
Nov09-
Jun10 
Subsidizable 
vehicles 
15,766.90 15,804.2 14,267.5 15,804.2 15,068.8 13,754.1 
Non-subsidizable 
vehicles 
24,065.50 22,203.3 20,033.2 22,203.3 18,988.9 21,911.6 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
We observed that trends in average prices of the subsidized vehicles and non-subsidized 
vehicles varied. In the first stage, while the prices for non-subsidized vehicles fell 7.7%, 
there was a slight increase (0.2%)23 in average prices for subsidized vehicles. All of the 
models saw a drop in prices as a result of the situation in the previous stage and this was 
more prominent in the non-subsidized vehicles: between September 2009 and June 2010, 
average prices for vehicles in the subsidized group fell 9.5%, while those in the non-
subsidized group fell a further 16.7%. 
Although these results may reflect an impact of the subsidy that contrasts with what the 
Government expected, they must be analyzed with caution; being descriptive, they do not 
account for supply factors (those which affect brand prices) or demand factors (perhaps 
there is a different behavior in the sales between subsidized and non-subsidized vehicles 
after the introduction of the Plan) so we had to be careful not to report inaccurate 
conclusions. 
                                                 
23 We carried out a test on average differences for each type of vehicle and compared the before with the first 
stage. In the case of subsidizable vehicles the average difference hypothesis is accepted (increase in first 
stage), while non-subsidizable are rejected. 
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An econometric analysis of the prices was carried out to determine whether there was a 
variation in price trends associated with vehicle type. 
4. Empirical strategy 
The present study has two objectives. The first is to analyze the effect that Plan 2000E had 
on the manufacturing prices of vehicles included in the Plan.24 We created an equation in 
which vehicle prices are a function of vehicle characteristics, total sales by brand (ideally we 
would use exact sales by automobile version, however this data is not publically available), 
the economic evolution of the country, the official price of crude oil and possible timing 
effects. These details are addressed in Section 4.1. 
Once we observed the impact of the program on prices set by the manufacturers, we then 
set out to determine whether the Plan was viable by estimating the benefits (i.e. the 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and the tax revenue derived from increased sales), 
and the costs derived from its implementation (i.e. the volume of public resources invested 
in the Plan).  
4.1. Effect of Plan 2000E on prices 
The forecast carried out considered the exact versions of vehicles that were available before 
and after the introduction of Plan 2000E, which only applied to vehicles with a sale price 
not in excess of 50,000€. Similarly, given the differences in vehicles within categories, we 
included an option that allowed us to carry out a cluster analysis by price and horsepower 
and thus obtain stronger results25. This allowed us to control potential differences in errors 
according to price bracket.  
The estimate by Berry et al. (1995) is the most commonly used for demand estimates and 
states that vehicle price and characteristics determine their sales. In this study, the 
characteristics of Plan 2000E meet the criteria of a quasi-natural experiment, meaning we 
can estimate the effect of the Plan using a difference-in-difference estimator. This allows us 
to have a control group (the versions of vehicles that are non-subsidized) and a treatment 
group (the versions of vehicles that are subsidized and meet the criteria for Plan 2000E). 
The correct implementation of difference-in-difference estimator requires that the 
differences between both groups (control and treatment group) are minimal, excepting 
from the treatment. The availability of versions of vehicles that are non-subsidized and 
versions that are subsidized in our database allows the implementation of difference-in-
difference, being the adherence to the Plan the only contrast between them. If there are 
differences between groups, the variable responsible for the differences must be controlled. 
In this study, the only difference between the control group and the treatment group is the 
                                                 
24 Given the high level of correlation, note that the forecasts do not vary considerably if the analysis is carried 
out with public sale price. 
25 The cluster analysis used K-means methodology to create groups. Calinski-Harabasz pseudo F-statitisc has 
been implemented to determine the optimal number of groups, seven in this case. See Calinski and Harabasz 
(1974). 
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pollution level, which must be controlled so that our estimations are not biased. Vehicle 
horsepower can be used to estimate the pollution level and thus allows us to measure and 
control this difference between the two groups. It is important to note that there are no 
other differences between the two groups with respect to the remaining characteristics 
because the same versions of cars were used in each group. This type of methodology is 
frequently used to analyze the effect of public policies. One example is a study by in 
Bennear (2007), in which he analyzes the effect of programs on pollution prevention in the 
United States. Another example comes from Albalate (2008) who assesses the impact of 
programs to reduce alcohol levels in European motorists, and finally Hinrichs (2010) 
investigates the effects of the “National School Lunch Program”. 
The first part of the methodology is to estimate the following equation: 
Manufacturerpriceit  0  1Subsidizablei  2Firststageit 
3DIDFirststageit  4Secondstageit  5DIDSecondstageit 
6Monthlysalesit  7Gasoline i  8Horsepowerii  9Guaranteei 
10Trunkcapacityi  11ABSi  12Numberofairbagsi 
13Powerassistedsteeringi   it
                    [1]	
Manufacturerpriceit is the wholesale price for each version of vehicle i at moment t. We used 
the following exogenous variables to try to explain what affects it: 
1. Subsidizablei: binary variable that takes value 1 if the version is a subsidizable one, 
i.e., if the vehicle is included in the Plan. 
2. Firststageit: binary variable that takes value 1 if wholesale price belongs to any of the 
four months of the first stage: May, June, July and August 2009. General effects on 
prices in this stage are captured by this variable, without differentiating between 
subsidized and non-subsidized vehicles. 
3. DIDFirststageit: this takes value 1 for subsidizable vehicles in the first four months of 
first stage. It is the product by two latter binary variables (1 and 2). It is the 
difference-in-difference estimator for the first stage of the Plan. A positive 
estimation of this variable indicates that prices of subsidized vehicles have 
increased compared to non-subsidized vehicles. 
4. Secondstageit: binary value that takes value 1 for the rest of the months in which the 
Plan is valid. It spans September 2009 to July 2010. This variable includes some of 
the first stage (two months in which the funding was over: September and October 
2009), the second and third stage of the Plan together. 
5. DIDSecondstageit: It is the difference-in-difference estimator for the latter variable 
(second stage). Its interpretation is the same as variable number 3. 
6. Monthlysalesit: this variable covers monthly sales (in units) of each brand during the 
period in question. Some endogeneity problems arise because these sales are 
influenced by the price set by manufacturer. For this reason we use a two-step 
estimator (Two Stage Least Minimum Squares) where the instruments are the 
Spanish GDP from 2007 to 2010 (measured on an annual basis in millions of 
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current euros), two temporal variables (year and summer26) and crude oil (Brent 
crude oil price, measured in dollars per barrel). 
7. Gasolinei: binary variable that takes value 1 if the vehicle uses gasoline. It takes value 
0 if the vehicle uses diesel.  
8. Horsepoweri: the horsepower of the vehicle. 
9. Guaranteei: the length of guarantee offered by the wholesaler (expressed in months). 
10. Trunkcapacityi: it measures the capacity of the trunk and is expressed in liters. 
11. ABSi: binary variable that takes value 1 if the vehicle has the ABS braking system. 
12. Numberofairbagsi: it is the number of airbags included in the car. 
13. Powerassistedsteeringi: binary variable that takes value 1 if the car has power assisted 
steering. 
We also estimate the following equation: 
Manufacturerpriceit  0  1Subsidizablei  2Firststageit 
3DIDFirststageit  4Septoct it  5DIDseptoct it  6Nov09june10 it 
7DIDNov09june10 it  8Monthlysalesit  9Gasolinei 
10Horsepowerii  11Guaranteei  12Trunkcapacityi  13ABSi 
14Numberofairbagsi  15Powerassisteddirectioni   it
                    [2] 
The new variables considered are: 
1. Septoctit: binary variable that takes value 1 if price is for the period between 
September and October 2009. 
2. DIDseptoctit: difference-in-difference estimator for September and October 2009. 
3. Nov09june10it: this variable takes value 1 for this range of months. It comprises the 
second and third stages of the Plan. 
4. Didnov09june10it: difference-in-difference estimator for months included in the 
second and third stages. 
The results from the forecasts in Equations [1] and [2] are shown in Table 4. In both cases 
the dependent variable is the manufacturer price from version i in period t. 
                                                 
26 It is a binary variable that takes value 1 for July and August. It is included due to seasonality of sales in 
summer period. 
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Table 4. Price equations estimations 
Explanatory variables Equation 1 Equation 2 
Subsidizable -1894.25(1269.83) -1917.48 (1243.63) 
First Stage 352.59 (382.24) 352.46 (389.41) 
DID First Stage 938.36* (522.79) 1012.67** (530.33) 
Second Stage 1032.42 (583.81)  
DID Second Stage -1112.71 (1140.61)  
Sept-Oct  874.42 (1047.08) 
DID Sept-Oct  -2268.85 (1556.67) 
Nov09-June10  1435.84 (933.35) 
DIDNov09-June10  -422.10 (1515.64) 
Monthly Sales -0.49*** (0.18) -0.54*** (0.16) 
Gasoline -3532.98*** (613.03) -3460.9*** (653.59) 
Horsepower 112.28*** (9.62) 111.04*** (8.54) 
Guarantee -99.50*** (20.54) -103.09*** (18.74) 
Trunk capacity 0.20 (0.31) 0.27 (0.34) 
ABS 618.09 (3046.6) 725.28 (3149.01) 
Number of airbags 217.22 (173.75) 232.19 (185.19) 
Power assisted direction 829.46 (1068.32) 842.52 (1106.32) 
Constant 9330.71*** (3479.00) 9432.54*** (3458.07) 
Observations 904 904 
R2 (centered) 0.78 0.78 
F-test 1.1e+08*** 1.1e+09*** 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors shown in brackets. 
Note 2: Monthly sales by brand have been estimated using the following instruments: GDP 
nominal, year, summer and crude price. 
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The explanatory capacity of the model was approximately 78% and the F-tests were 
accepted at 1% in all of the cases.  
With respect to the explanatory variables, the quantity of vehicles sold is significantly low, 
which explains the inverse relationship between price and quantity. Recall that this variable 
is instrumented based on GDP, price of crude, year and summer27. Some characteristics of 
the vehicles are significant and determine that diesel vehicles, with greater horsepower or 
larger trunks, are factors that increase the vehicle manufacturer price. It is interesting to 
observe that the vehicles with longer guarantees have lower prices. A test was carried out 
on some brands that are found in lower market segments, and revealed how they offered a 
longer guarantee in this period28. 
Nevertheless, the variables of greatest interest in the study are difference-in-difference 
estimators. Both forecasts gave the same result: during the application of the first stage of 
the Plan, subsidized vehicle prices increased by approximately 1,000 euros compared to 
non-subsidized vehicles. So we can conclude that during this period (from May to August 
2009), a positive effect was observed on the prices of subsidized vehicles. Diamond (2009) 
indicated that manufacturers could incorporate public assistance funds in their price 
structure and thus establish a higher price for vehicles. Incorporating this concept into our 
study, we can say that a large part of the subsidy could go directly towards subsidizing the 
manufacturers without significantly influencing the adoption of new vehicles, which would 
work against the program objectives. However, the report by the CNC (2009) indicated 
that Plan 2000E would probably result in an increase in the nominal and effective price 
received by the dealer by about 1,000 euros, since they have incentives in maintaining the 
same price prior to the introduction of the Plan. 
We have not found any other analysis in the literature that focus on the impact of public 
assistance in established manufacturer prices. Nevertheless, Busse et al. (2006) showed how 
consumers obtained between 70% and 90% of the discounts offered directly to consumers, 
while the discounts offered to the vehicle dealers only reached 30% or 40% of consumers. 
The authors believe that the information asymmetries are responsible for these differences. 
Therefore we can conclude that in the first stage of the Plan by increasing their prices by 
1,000 euros for the subsidized versions of certain vehicles, the manufacturers "collected" 
this amount rather than it being passed on to the consumer,. At this point it is not possible 
to determine the effect of different prices on different types of vehicles, likely due to the 
uncertainty created by the Plan. In summary, half of the fixed 2,000€ subsidy in the Plan 
was taken by the manufacturers and thus in reality the Plan consisted of a 1,000€ subsidy 
paid to the consumer upon replacement of an old vehicle, and the same amount paid to the 
manufacturers. The part of the Plan that ended up being the subsidy to the manufacturers 
                                                 
27 The Kleibergen-Paap and Stock-Yogo statistics indicate that our instruments do not properly solve the 
problem of endogeneity of the monthly sales by brand variable. This fact can make the coefficient of this 
variable be biased towards zero, so the effect of sales on price could be greater. 
28 In fact, the longest guarantee is given by KIA (84 months). Nissan offers 36 months, Seat, 24. 
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obviously does not create or reduce pollution levels nor does it increase vehicle sales; thus 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Plan are unclear. 
4.2. Environmental efficiency of Plan 2000E 
To estimate the benefits of the program29, we calculated the benefits of reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions generated by the vehicles included in the Plan and the tax 
revenue generated from increased sales. 
To quantify the benefits of reduced greenhouse gas emissions we assumed that the Plan 
replaced cars with average greenhouse gas emission levels of 1990 indicated by the 
European Union (180 grams de CO2/Km) with less polluting cars i.e. those included in the 
subsidized range of vehicles described in Plan 2000E (133.92 grams of CO2/Km) (see 
Table 6). 
After calculating the reduction in pollution production per kilometer, we multiplied these 
savings by the number of kilometers that the car would travel after one year (24,000 km), 
by the number of years this car could expect to run (15 years)30 and by the number of cars 
included in the Plan (461,838 vehicles). This allowed us to determine the number of tons of 
CO2 emissions that would be avoided as a result of the Plan, which we could then translate 
into a monetary value. This was achieved by multiplying the number of tons of CO2 by the 
average price of emission rights of a ton of CO2 in the market during 2010 (€14.32).  
The other element of Plan 2000E that brought benefits was the increase in tax collected 
from the sale of automobiles. The sale of any type of vehicle generates revenue for the 
public treasury from Value Added Tax (VAT) and vehicle registration tax (IM). In this case, 
since a 2,000 euro subsidy was available for the purchase of a vehicle, the Treasury 
Department would receive additional revenue, since the subsidy would be included as an 
income increase and thus be declared in individual income tax filings (IRPF). 
This income is very important, as seen in the report by the Union of Analysts of the 
Spanish Treasury Department (GESTHA). In this report they estimated that each one of 
the vehicles generated 2,643€ in revenue with the following breakdown: 196€ from income 
tax, 1,958€ from VAT and 489€ from vehicle registration tax. These figures were actually 
used by the analysts at the Spanish Treasury Department to ensure that Plan 2000E was 
profitable. The result was estimated revenue of approximately 1.2€ billion, which was 
greater than the costs of the Plan. 
It is important to highlight that these results are only accurate if we assume that all users 
that took part in the Plan would not have changed their vehicle had the Plan not been in 
                                                 
29 It is not our objective to perform a Cost-Benefit analysis, since we do not have information on the 
reduction in claims due to new vehicles or the time reduction displacement that could occur due to the 
improvement in their technical characteristics, elements that would improve the benefits from the Program. 
In addition we assume a fixed price for emitted CO2 and that all variables increase at the same interest rate. 
30 Following the European Commission et al (1999), the average lifetime of a vehicle is between 9 and 10 
years, with exceptions that can reach 15. 
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place. This assumption is reflected in the first column of Table 6, in which we assume that 
the 461,838 vehicles included in the Plan account for newly created demand. 
Nevertheless this data is not reality, so to estimate the effect of the Plan on subsidized 
vehicle sales we followed Equation 3. In these forecasts, unlike those shown in Table 4, we 
used annual sales by model. We did this because sales by brand have an associated monthly 
periodicity, which tells us with greater variability that we are observing a monthly effect of 
the Plan. However, to distinguish between subsidized and non-subsidized models we 
carried out a sales forecast with annual figures by model. 
We created the following equation: 
Annualsalesbymodelit  0  1Subsidizablei  2Susidizableperiod it 
3DIDSusidizableperiod it  4Manufacturerpriceit  5Horsepoweri 
6Numberofairbagsit  7Yeariti   it
                        [3] 
From Equation 1 in Table 5 we used the variable subsidizable as binary. If the corresponding 
model had 50% or more versions that were subsidizable, then the variable takes on a value 
of 1, otherwise it is zero. In Equation 2, we defined the variable subsidizable as the 
percentage of versions within the model that were subsidizable. Results are shown in Table 
5. 
Table 5. Estimations of annual sales by model 
Explanatory variables Equation 1 Equation 2 
Subsidizable -34,672.96*** (13,102.37) -51,533.96** (24,398.67) 
Subsidizable period -14,832.25 (11,457.05) -16,760.29 (11,839.07) 
DID Subsidizable period 38,238.22*** (15,094.3) 46,830.94** (20,923.82) 
Manufacturer price -0.04 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) 
Horsepower -396.49*** (154.53) -419.68** (197.73) 
Number of airbags 10,880.52*** (3,558.01) 10,885.22** (4,261.99) 
Year -14,677.22*** (4,523.96) -13,381.99*** (4,718.23) 
Constant 2.95e+07*** (9,090,175) 2.69e+07*** (9,488,043) 
Observations 490 490 
F-test 2.32** (0.0457) 1.91* (0.0953) 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors shown in brackets. 
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As Table 5 shows, the effect of the Plan on sales defined by Equation 1 and Equation 2 
ranges from 38,238 to 46,830 units, respectively. If we use the results from Equation 1 as a 
reference and consider the sales data during the period when the subsidy was in force (2009 
and 2010), sales figures of subsidized vehicles increased to 805,458. This equates to an 
impact of 4.75% on sales. This result is close to that obtained in the analysis performed by 
the Fesvial Company and GfK Emer Ad Hoc Research (2009), in which they reported that 
the Plan “encourages many individuals to buy a vehicle” based on 5% of the survey 
participants. 
If we calculate sales using Equation 2, the sales figures of subsidizable vehicles is 682,657 
units. The impact in this case would be 6.86%, which is very similar to the results using 
Equation 1. 
Regardless of the empirical evidence, in the additional columns from the efficiency analysis 
included in Table 6 we uncovered new demand generating capacities of the Plan, starting 
with the previously mentioned 100% to 10%. 
In terms of the benefits derived from the reduction of polluting emissions, the benefits 
depend on the capacity of the Plan to create demand for less polluting vehicles. Our survey 
found that a large percentage of participants would have exchanged their car for a less 
polluting model even if the Plan did not exist, thus a reduction in pollution levels would 
have been seen even without the Plan. 
As above, the benefits derived from tax revenue depend on the capacity of the Plan to 
create demand. If, for example, 40% of sales came from newly created demand, then 60% 
of the users would have changed their car anyway and would still have paid VAT and 
registration taxes. Personal income tax collection if we must maintain that the collection of 
cars included in the Plan, independently if the change of car by the introduction of the Plan 
or not. This is due to the increase in income that is subject to income tax generated as a 
direct result of the Plan, and without this the increase in personal income tax collection 
would not have occurred. As we can see, the benefits and therefore the effectiveness of the 
Plan depend on its capacity to generate new demand. 
With respect to the program costs we have only taken into account the expenses assumed 
by the local and national governments. To calculate these costs we multiplied the total 
number of cars included in the Plan 2000E (461,838 vehicles) by the 1,000€ subsidy per 
vehicle contributed by the local and federal government. The costs do not depend in any 
case on the capacity that this has to create new vehicle demand since the subsidy is given to 
all of the users that participated in the Plan, not only those who would have changed their 
car anyway, but also to those who would not have changed their car without the Plan. 
Results are shown in Table 6 
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Table 6. Comparison of revenues and costs for Public Administration derived from Plan2000E, depending on new demand generated 
 
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 
Pollution old vehicles (1) 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Pollution new vehicles (1) 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 133.92 
Yearly kilometers 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 
Useful life of vehicles (years) 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Number of car subsidized by 
the Plan 
461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 461,838 
Avoided tons of CO2  7,661,338.214 6,895,204.393 6,129,070.572 5,362,936.75 4,596,802.929 3,830,669.107 3,064,535.286 2,298,401.464 1,532,267.643 766,133.821 
Price per ton of CO2 (2) 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 14.32 
Savings (€) of avoided CO2  109,710,363.2 98,739,326.91 87,768,290.58 76,797,254.26 65,826,217.94 54,855,181.62 43,884,145.29 32,913,108.97 21,942,072.65 10,971,036.32 
Costs of the Plan 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 461,838,000 
Taxes revenues due to Plan 1,220,637,834 1,107,626,075 994,614,316.8 881,602,558.2 768,590,799.6 655,579,041 542,567,282.4 429,555,523.8 316,543,765.2 203,532,006.6 
Results 868,510,197.2 744,527,402.3 620,544,607.4 496,561,812.5 372,579,017.5 248,596,222.6 124,613,427.7 630,632.769 -123,352,162.2 -247,334,957.1 
Source: Own elaboration. 
(1) CO2 emissions in gr/km. 
(2) In euros, according to quotation  
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Table 7 shows the net effect of Plan 2000E, which strongly depends on the Plan’s capacity 
to create new demand in the market. If we assume that the majority of the 461,838 vehicles 
would not have been sold without the Plan, the large increase in tax revenue from the Plan 
would have had a net positive effect, that is, the revenues for Public Administration from 
the Plan would exceed the costs. However, if new demand creation capacity falls below 
30%31, costs exceed revenues and the plan becomes socially undesirable for Public 
Administration. This result is very important since it tells us that the Plan is inefficient 
particularly in that alternative costs with an equivalent cost would further reach better 
results.  
The great majority of costs and revenues considered in table 6 are income transfers from 
the Government to producers and consumers, which should be taking into account when 
performing a Cost-Benefits analysis. Nevertheless, the main objective of this section is to 
determine whether the Plan 2000E is the most efficient policy (the one in which has to 
invest less funds) the Public Administration has at its disposal to reduce the emissions of 
CO2.   
According to our estimations, the Plan only generates a new demand of 5%, what means 
that the consumers who benefit from the subsidy do not change their behavior. As a 
consequence, reductions of CO2 are not generated. The amount of CO2 saved from the 
new demand creation of 5% is about 766,000 tons. When we compare the savings of 
avoided CO2 with the costs of the Plan 2000E that the Public Administration must bear, 
which are approximately 461 millions euros, we obtain that the proportion of cost per ton 
is close to 602€, when the value in the market of these tons is 14.32€. 
Available information concerning the impact of public assistance on the generation of new 
demand in the automobile industry seems to show that the results of Plan 2000E are far 
from the percentage levels that make a Plan beneficial from the perspective of Public 
Administration. Furthermore, our data clearly indicate that the implementation of the 
program resulted in a net loss for the Spanish economy. As we observed in the 
Introduction of this study, research has shown that the capacity to create new demand 
based on public assistance is about 20%. 
At the time of writing this, there was no academic reference on Plan 2000E in the 
literature; this was the only study to analyze the impact of automobile demand on 
environmental efficiency. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, Fesvial Company and GfK Emer 
Ad Hoc Research (2009) carried out a survey of 1,061 individuals in which they assessed 
whether Plan 2000E encouraged them to change their car. When faced with the specific 
question “How much has the new Plan influenced you to purchase a car in 2009?” only 5% 
answered “a lot” and about 15% replied with “somewhat”, while the remaining 80% did 
not show any intentions of changing their car because of the Plan. Thus, it seems that Plan 
2000E at best led to new demand creation of 20%, a figure quite similar to the one 
                                                 
31 The analysis carried out revealed that a Plan 2000E value of 29% new demand creation would be beneficial 
for Public Administration, while we do not consider income transfers to producers and consumers.  
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obtained for the case of hybrid cars in the North American market. The econometric 
estimate indicates that the effect on sales by the Plan is about 5%. 
Table 7 shows the results for different studies in addition to the results obtained from the 
present survey on Plan 2000E. 
 
Table 7. New demand generated by public subsidies 
Article Country Year Type of vehicle
Subsidy 
quantity 
Net effect 
on sales 
Gallagher y Muehlegger (2011) USA 1999-2006 Hybrid 2,000-3,400$ 22% 
Beresteanu y Li (2011) USA 1999-2006 Hybrid 2,000-3,400$ 20% 
Chandra et al. (2010) Canada 2000-2007 Hybrid 1,000-3,000$ 26% 
Huang (2010) USA 2009 Conventional 3,500-4,500$ 25-30% 
Diamond (2009) USA 2001-2006 Hybrid 2,000-3,400$ 18% 
Fesvial y GfK Emer Ad Hoc 
Research (2009) 
Spain 2009-2010 Conventional 2,000€ 5-20% 
Jiménez et al (2011) Spain 2009-2010 Conventional 2,000€ 5-7% 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Therefore, the capacity to create new demand by public assistance programs requires in all 
cases a figure of about 20%, which is greater than the result of Plan 2000E this leads us to 
the conclusion that Plan 2000E was not socially desirable. With this level of new demand 
creation, the Plan would have generated social welfare losses of €123 million. Note that at 
this percentage, the benefits of the Plan do not even cover the public sector expense 
(€1,000 per vehicle). If the impact of the Plan on the generation of new demand is 5% as 
indicated by our forecasts and the survey carried out by Fesvial and GfK Emer Ad Hoc 
Research (2009), the losses would add up to more than €309 million. 
These results are reported despite the very favorable Plan assumptions: 15 year vehicle 
lifetime, 24,000 kilometers per year use, and approximately 130 grams of CO2/Km 
recommended by the E.U.; all of which contribute to the avoidance of greenhouse gas 
emissions. In addition, we assumed that the consumers who decided to change to a 
subsidizable vehicle did so because of the Plan (the alternative being not to change at all) 
when actually it is possible that many consumers changed to cars that are non-subsidizable 
yet less polluting. Thus, we have also obtained a reduction in pollution. It is clear that if we 
changed some of these assumptions the results from the Plan would only worsen social 
welfare. These assumptions clearly indicate that from an environmental perspective, Plan 
2000E was an inefficient policy introduction. 
As an alternative to direct assistance programs, there is a growing popularity in the 
economic literature towards increases in fuel tax and energy efficient vehicle standards. 
Greene et al. (2005) showed how a tax system in which taxes are fixed on vehicles with 
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energy efficiency below a certain level, and whose revenue serves to subsidize the most 
efficient vehicles, would significantly increase the energy economy of the vehicles.  
Austin and Dinan (2005) compared how the modification of vehicle standards and/or the 
increase in fuel tax help reduce pollutants. The results of the simulation model highlight 
that the tax increase caused greater immediate savings than the modification of standards 
because it introduced individual incentives to drive less and choose more energy efficient 
vehicles. 
Linn and Klier (2007) also reported that when faced with an expected increase in fuel 
prices, driving costs increased for the less efficient cars, creating new demand for more 
energy efficient vehicles. The authors estimated than an increase in fuel price of one dollar 
caused an increase in the energy efficiency of new vehicles by 0.5 miles per gallon of fuel. 
The capacity to reduce vehicle pollutants by taxes has also been observed by Sterner 
(2007). In this study the author shows that fuel consumption, and therefore pollution 
levels, would be much higher if fuel taxes did not exist within the countries in the OECD. 
This evidence leads the author to conclude that fuel taxes are the most powerful 
instrument in the fight against climatic change. 
Similarly, Ryan et al. (2009) observed that the Road Fund Tax is the most efficient 
mechanism to reduce pollution levels of the vehicles within the countries of the European 
Union. Specifically, an increase of 10% in the Road Fund Tax caused a reduction in 
pollution levels of the fleet of vehicles equal to 0.3 grams per kilometer in the short term, 
which increased to 1.4 grams per kilometer in the long term.  
To summarize, it seems that tax mechanisms (i.e. fuel taxes and vehicle taxes) have a 
greater influence on the pollution levels of the vehicles and imply a lower cost for local, 
regional and national governments32. 
5. Conclusions 
The automobile industry is one of the most important manufacturing sectors for current 
national economies. Their high production values and their labor intensity continue to have 
an important effect on governments, namely that they are traditionally concerned about the 
development and stability of this industry in its territories. 
With the economic crisis affecting many developed countries starting in 2008, the 
automobile industry has reported a significant drop in sales, resulting in increased 
unemployment in the sector. Faced with this situation many governments have introduced 
programs to stimulate the replacement of old cars for new vehicles through scrappage 
                                                 
32 Bento et al (2009) also show that the distribution of the resources obtained from the tax increase can 
improve income distribution. If the resources were uniformly distributed, the average households in the last 
four income percentiles would improve their situation. If the resources were shared proportionally to income 
level, only the highest and lowest percentile would improve their social welfare. 
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schemes, with two main objectives: to increase automobile sales and reduce pollution 
levels. 
Even though these programs are important there is an absence of empirical evidence on 
their effects. Studies on scrappage schemes in the United States have shown how this type 
of program can lead to an increase in sales of approximately 20%, however, we know 
nothing about the European market. 
At the same time we do not know what effect the programs can have on the prices set by 
the manufacturers and whether these programs are desirable effects i.e. whether the costs 
of the program are lesser or greater than the benefits generated. 
This study analyzed the effect of the prices fixed by manufacturers in Plan 2000E, which is 
a Spanish program that offered a subsidy of 2,000€ to consumers to replace old vehicles 
with newer, less polluting ones. It was co-financed by the manufacturers (€1,000 euros), 
National Government (€500 euros) and Autonomous Communities (€500 euros).  
Using difference-in-difference we observed that the Plan caused an increase of 1,000€ in 
the price of subsidized cars, meaning that the subsidy of 2,000€ ended up being shared 
between the consumers, who would only receive a net discount of 1,000€, and the 
manufacturers, who would receive the remaining 1,000€.  
Thus, the success of the Plan in achieving its objectives was limited since half of the fixed 
subsidy in the program went to the manufacturers and did not generate any type of 
incentive to the consumer to exchange vehicles for less polluting ones. 
In addition to the first estimate of the net effects generated by Plan 2000E it is also clear 
that the Plan did not generate results for Public Administration. Even though we assumed 
favorable hypotheses, the result of our forecast was a negligible capacity to generate new 
demand of only 5%, compared to the 30% required to make the program efficient. 
From the empirical analyses carried out in the United States and the survey of Plan 2000E, 
the estimated increase in demand capacity was approximately 20%. Assuming this 20% 
capacity for the generation of new demand, the program leads to losses of more than 123€ 
million, which would increase if the capacity to create new demand was lower. Losses 
would be greater than 300€ million with a 5% change in demand.  
The results are clearly conclusive: the program is inefficient, subsidizing a large part to the 
manufacturers directly instead of the consumers. In addition, the high costs of the program 
and its reduced impact make Plan 2000E undesirable from Public Administration 
perspective. 
If the real objective of government is to reduce the level of pollution caused by the vehicle 
fleet, economic literature has shown how other more efficient mechanisms exist and are 
less costly to the sector. The increase of fuel taxes or the fixing of more severe energy 
efficiency standards are examples of alternative mechanisms that can help meet goals in 
pollution prevention. 
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